عنوان مقاله [English]
In Logik der Forschung, Popper points out that in the logic of science as he has outlined, it would be possible to avoid using the concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’. But Popper’s point of view on truth changed fundamentally after he became acquainted with Tarski’s semantic theory of truth, and after that he never doubted to introduce science “as the search for truth”. Although, Popper’s specific reading of Tarski’s semantic theory of truth has been criticized by some philosophers, but most of these criticisms are intended to show that Popper’s version of truth can’t be concluded from the genuine Tarski’s theory. In this paper, I will argue that even if we ignore the mentioned criticisms, yet we can show that the correspondence, objective and absolute concept of truth, considering his metaphysical idea about reality (i.e. reality has infinitely or indefinitely many layers), would be inefficient in his philosophy of science, or at best, it’s efficiency will be minimum. So, if the following arguments are successful, the concept of truth will not be able to play an important role in Popper’s philosophy of science.