عنوان مقاله [English]
The assumption that people understand each other by employing a
‘folk’ or “commonsense” psychology is currently pervasive in
philosophy of mind, cognitive science and various other disciplines.
Folk psychology is almost always taken to consist primarily of an
ability to attribute internal propositional attitude states, principally
beliefs and desires, in order to predict and explain behavior in a
deductive structure, so “folk psychology” also called “belief- desire
psychology”. But this is not the only theory that considers interaction
between people, there is also a rival that called simulation theory. This
theory is the greatest opponent of “folk psychology”. In this research
I, like Ratcliff, call all the things that people do to understand, explain
and predict each other, folk psychology. And call the first view “folk
psychology as a theory of mind” and the second one “folk psychology
as a mental simulation” or “simulation” alone. In this paper I will begin
by the most accepted view, folk psychology as a theory of mind, ,
based on Fodor’s view, then we will come to some critics that bring up
by Goldman. After these critics we will present simulation view and
answer to some of its critics to “folk psychology as a theory of mind”.
Then, at the end of the essay I will conclude that we can mix this to
view together and present a hybrid theory to consider what people
really do to explain and predict each other behavior.