نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
ندارد
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Abstract
The truthmaker principle – which looks to be based upon a seemingly
plausible intuition – faces a number of troubles, including that of
negative truths. According to the truthmaker principle, true
propositions are true in virtue of what exists. But, intuitively, negative
truths are true in virtue of what does not exist. Adding negative facts to
one’s ontology isa metaphysical cost that has been paid to solve the
problem of negative truths. In this paper, I firstly mention some
preliminary issues about the truthmaker principle. After enumerating
possible solutions to negative truths, I will deal with the solution which
appeals to negative facts. Then I will argue that which kind of negative
facts does better its jobs. In the rest of the paper, I will disallow some
propounded difficulties with this solution. Afterwards, I will illustrate
that negative facts face three new problems.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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