نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
ندارد
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
In this paper, I try to give a clear reading of Carnap's conventionalism
against the prevalent philosophical back ground of the day. The
background had been painted in Wittgensetinian colors, which were
deemed by Carnap to be rusty, dogmatic and unacceptable. It begins
with the primary satisfaction of logical empiricists with Wittgensteinian
approach to truth and the status of logical sentences (a satisfaction
which ended to a deep dissatisfaction soon enough). Then I attend to
Carnap's remarkable criticisms of Wittgenstein's absolutist point of
view, which is devoid of necessary conventional elements. At the end,
we will see that Carnap's attempt at suggesting an alternative scheme
for explaining the status of logical and mathematical sentences, as it is
put forward in Logical Syntax of Language (1934), suffers from similar
shortcomings. This does not need to debase the brilliant points which
emerged out of Carnap's critical reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy,
though.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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